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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA MEENDERINK,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appeal No. 20050466

STEVEN MEENDERINK,
Respondent /Appellant.

Respondent, Appellant Steven Meenderink "Steven" submits this Reply brief
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
State Statutes
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.Determination of amount of support - Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order
unless there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor or
obligee or adjustment under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made,
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for
prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in the order,
without a showing of a material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(1) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award required
by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction
of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, or
a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been filed, the court
determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a
proposed award of child support using the guidelines before an order awarding child
support or modifying an existing award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish
support after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to:

(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
©) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the
adult child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages
based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this chapter.
Amended by Chapter 53, 1998 General Session

Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying
an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in
establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the
guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the
use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless
rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that
complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from
use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child
in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts
the presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated order.
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if:
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a nonguidelines order;
(b) the guidelines worksheet has the box checked for a deviation and has an explanation
as to the reason; or
©) the deviation was made because there were more children than provided for in the
guidelines table.
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ, but the
difference is less than $10, the order shall not be considered deviated and the incomes
listed on the worksheet may be used in adjusting support for emancipation.
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent
and are not children in common to both parties may at the option of either party be taken
into account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child support award, as
provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not be given if:
(I) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists would
have their child support reduced; or
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor would
increase.
2

(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the
respective parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted
from the appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the instant case.
(7) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive
children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both parties may be
applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied:
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of the
obligor from the most recent order; or
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee would
be decreased from the most recent order.
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous three
years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust the amount
of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into account
the best interests of the child, determine whether there is a difference between the
amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the guidelines. If there is
a difference of 10% or more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court
shall adjust the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
©) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an
adjustment under Subsection (8)(b).
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust
the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(I) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of others.
©) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account
the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it
has, the court shall then determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be
required under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not of a
temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that
which is provided for in the guidelines.
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9)
shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after July 1, 1997.
Amended by Chapter 176, 2003 General Session
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78-45-7.5 Determination of gross income - Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except
under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts
from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers'
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the original support
order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the
court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to
provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family
Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance,
Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
©) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses
necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from
gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount
of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall
provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax
returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not
reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department
of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and
income tax returns.
©) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
4

underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the
amount imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
©) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis
for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn
minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job
skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's
presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such
as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent
shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based,
by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned
income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.

78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their
adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable. Except during
periods of court-ordered parent-time as set forth in Section 78-45-7.11, the parents are
obligated to pay their proportionate shares of the base combined child support
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obligation. . . .
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 845-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly,
the base child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation
table; and
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support
obligation by multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's
percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
DISPUTE OF APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Petitioner/Appellee "Debra" has suggested that Steven behaved in dilatory
behavior such as changing counsel, and asking for continuances, thereby validating the
court's decisions regarding child support and attorney fees. More correctly, Steven's
previous counsel withdrew, both for financial reasons. Once Steven again had counsel,
Steven requested additional time to secure a medical and vocational expert. (R264)
Debra brought no experts to trial. Steven promptly proceeded to trial once he had again
retained counsel.
2. Steven did not request a second continuance, (Appellee's Brief page 7) but
rather an additional setting for the one day trial so that the vocational expert could
testify. The phone conference cited in the record at R300-301 was related to the Social
Security Administration filing a Motion to Quash the subpoena for Joleen Wyler, an
employee of the Social Security Administration"SSA," who had worked with Steve on his
eligibility for benefits. (R300-301) The response of the SSA was not within Steven's
control, and Judge Dutson made serious, but unsuccessful efforts to compel the
testimony. (R306-307) Steven cooperated in every manner with this effort.
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DISPUTE OF PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Steven's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was filed on July 13, 2001.
2. Although Steven was receiving Social Security Disability ("SSDI") at the time of
the divorce, that income was subsequently found by the Social Security Administration
("SSA") to be an error and overpayment. The disability payments were discontinued
shortly after entry of the Decree. Due to a delay between Steven resuming work and the
SSA ceasing the payments, Steven was subject to Social Security recoupment. Even at
the time of trial Steven was repaying the overpayment, thereby reducing his benefits.
(T185) At the time of the divorce, by the parties' agreement, Steven was actually
receiving the children's payments as their representative payee. (T157).
3. Debra implies that Steven acknowledged that he did not give any of the SSDI
money to Debra and that he only paid child support "when he could." (Appellee's Brief
9) Steven's evidence demonstrated that during the year 2000 he paid $4,830 directly to
Debra in addition to the SSDI she received. (Exhibit R13) Steven actually explained, "I
had worked for about three months from October (1999) to January 10th (2000). And I
made child support payments to her at that point. From April of 1999 to September of
1999 I made child support payments to her out of the unemployment income that I got.
And there were other times when, for example, when my Grandmother would give me a
hundred bucks, I would give her half of it. And I had got some short term disability
checks from Discover Card, their insurance company and I gave her half of those as
well." (T42-43)
4. By the time Debra returned to work in the year 2000, the children were all in
7

school full time, and there was no necessity for Debra to remain at home all day.
5. Dr. Joseph Ottowicz, did not testify that Steven "should have no restrictions for
any type of office work," but rather that he did not have "significant restrictions" on
sedentary type activities. He was found to have intact function from the waist up, and
would not have limiting restrictions to lift or carry objects from a sitting position. (T112113) However, he had limitations on walking and carrying objects due to balancing
problems. (T113)
6. Steven testified that he attended a family wave running party once per year,
and that he attended dances but simply stands and leans. (T159).
7. Steven's participation at the gym was felt by Dr. Ottowicz to be necessary to
maintain his present level of function. (T119-120).
8. Ramona Snell, a Rehabilitation Counselor employed through the State of Utah
testified that her role was to find "suitable employment" because "he would stay with it
longer if he is satisfied with it." (T145) She indicated Steven was cooperative, wanted to
work and she believed he would have taken a job if they had found one for him. (T145).
9. While Steven did keep a portion of his personal injury settlement check, the
settlement agreement from his automobile accident included a payment to Debra of
$4350 which was to be credited toward child support. (Exhibit R13, A12)
10. Debra's evidence claiming child support arrearage at time of trial did not
credit SSDI payments, included interest, and included arrearage beginning April 1999.
(Exhibit P2-7) Steven provided a written agreement between the parties, that he was
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fully paid through May 15,1999. (Exhibit R14)
11. Debra's evidence, Exhibit P 2-7 showing arrearage of $13,825 at the time of
trial was disputed, by Steven and his exhibits. (R13 B1-55) The Court failed to make a
ruling on this dispute.
ARGUMENT - REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
Point I. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE
CHILDREN'S SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS, SHOULD NOT BE CREDITED
AGAINST STEVEN'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION, PARTICULARLY IN ADDITION
TO ANY CHILD SUPPORT PAID.
Steven recognized that the trial Court is accorded discretion in certain factors
related to a petition to modify child support. Accordingly, Steven accepted the Court's
determination that he could work, and did not appeal that decision. Thereby, under the
current Court's order, the children are to receive $884 per month as child support
effective September 1, 2004. The children were receiving $672 per month Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") at the time of trial.
However, it should be of no consequence to the court or Debra Meenderink
whether the funds received by the children are paid partially from their dependant's
Social Security Disability Insurance checks and the remainder supplemented through
Steven's personal funds earned through employment or his separate Social Security
Disability Insurance check. Debra has complained that "Steven is not responsible for
his children" (Appellee's Brief 15, 16) although she has actually received SSDI payments
and additional cash payments totaling $45,834.00 over the 52 months which are in
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dispute (1999 through April 2004 ).1 Because the benefits are derived through Steven's
past contributions through employment, "No principled distinction exists between social
security benefits and child support payments." Brooks v. Brooks 881 P.2d 955, 962 (Ut.
App. 1994). So long as the children receive an amount totaling $884 per month, the
court's decision to uphold the amount of child support previously ordered would be
accomplished.
The argument that the children should receive $884 in child support benefits in
addition to $672 per month from SSDI benefits defeats the purpose of the children's
Social Security Disability benefit. The purpose of the children's SSDI dependent
benefits payment is to replace support the child loses upon the disability of the wage
earner responsible for the child's support, thereby enabling a disabled parent to fulfill his
financial obligations to his dependants. Brooks at 962 .
Petitioner's argument that the Court found that "Steven believed he did not have
to work as long as he obtained SSDI" (Appellee's Brief page 15) raises the concern that
the order was entered for punitive reasons and to force Steven into full time employment
even if he were satisfying his child support obligation.
The Utah legislature intended to apply the Social Security Disability benefits in the
manner intended under humanitarian goals of the Social Security Act; to assist SSDI
recipients who are child support obligors, in meeting their child support obligations. This
is accomplished through the dependants' SSDI income which flows to the children

'This averages $954.87 per month; exceeding the $884 monthly child support
obligation. (Respondent's Exhibit 13B)
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secondary to the earner's efforts. This is in contrast to other tax funded state and
federal assistance which is not counted as income to a parent or credited to the obligor's
child support obligations under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5 (3). There is no
reasonable explanation why the children should receive uncredited income, based on
their father's disability, in addition to full child support paid from his other resources.
This court has stated:
Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to evince the "true intent and
purpose of the legislature as expressed through the plain language of the
Act." In doing so we seek to render all parts there of relevant and
meaningful and accordingly we avoid interpretations that will render
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.
Johansen v. Johansen 2002 UT App 75, U 7, 45 P.3d 520
Debra relies on the language of §78-45-7.2, ("considering the children's best
interests") as justification for the court to rebut the application of the statutory guidelines
regarding modification of a Decree. The statute at issue in this matter, §78-45-7.5,
while part of the entire Uniform Liability for Child Support Act Utah Code, Title 78
Chapter 45, is contained in a section separate from §78-45-7.2. The pertinent
subsection, §78-45-7.5 b, as amended in 1997, specifically replaced the discretionary
word "may" with the mandatory word "shall". Under these circumstances, this court must
balance its duty to consider the language of §78-45-7.2 in its entirety, with the duty to
follow the legislature's intent when it made the particular amendment in §75-45-(8)(b).
"When interpreting a statute we first look to the plain language." Brinkerhoff v.
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Considering this, there is no
plausible reason why the legislature would change the language of §78-45-7.5 (8)(b)

11

except that it intended for the social security payments to be credited toward the child
support obligation in cases where the obligor parent was the source for the funds.
Debra's proposed interpretation would render subsection (8)(b) inoperative.
Debra suggests that the court has unfettered discretion in all decisions regarding
child support modification, and need never follow the various provisions within the
statute and guidelines if it is in the best interests of the child. Debra cites Diener v.
Diener 2004 UT App.314, 98 P.3d 1178, which stated "In qualifying the duties of the trial
court, the legislature limited the otherwise mandatory nature of the word "shall" and
vested trial courts with a measure of discretion in determining the appropriateness of a
petition to modify." Diener at 1182. The court was referring to Utah Code Ann. Section
§78-45-7.2.
Although Section §78-45-7.2 discusses the court's "measure of discretion" in
determining whether modification of the support order is in the child's best interest, it
does not dictate that the discretion controls §78-45-7.5 (8)(b). Section 78-45-7.5, covers
determination of income, and section (8)(b) covers how a specific type of income,
children's Social Security benefits, should be applied. The statute determines how
Social Security benefits derived from a parent shall be credited and then specifically
states that "other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent
depending upon the circumstances of each case." By specifically signifying that the
Social Security benefits "shall" be credited and then discussing how other benefits "may"
be considered "depending on the circumstances of each case" it is clear that the
legislature intended that the Social Security benefits be consistently credited to the
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parent without allowing for the court's discretion.
Crediting the children's payments toward the child support obligation effectuates
the intentions of the legislature in amending the subsection (8)(b). Under this scheme,
if the child support exceeds the children's SSDI payments, Steven would then need to
pay the remainder of support from his other resources.
The issue and applicable statute in Diener was §78-45-7.2. In Diener. although
this court recognized the trial court's discretion in determining whether to modify a
decree, the appellate court ultimately remanded the case because the trial court had not
made the necessary findings to support its decision that modification was not in the best
interests of the child. Diener at 1183.
Therefore, although the trial court may have had the discretion to deny Steven's
proposed modification of the amount of child support, it exceeded its discretion and
misapplied the law in it's ruling regarding application of the children's SSDI payments.
The trial court disregarded the plain language, statutory scheme and legislative intent of
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (8)(b), by denying the credit. It is clear that the legislature
intended that such children's Social Security payments should be credited toward the
earning parent's child support obligation.
Point II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE PROCESS REQUIRED OF
UTAH CODE §78-45-7.2 AND MADE INADEQUATE FINDINGS REGARDING LACK OF
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Debra has cited many findings which reflect the court's opinion of Steven's efforts
to work. However, while the court adequately supported its decision that Steven could
work, it failed to make detailed findings regarding each parent's income and how those
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incomes should be combined to determine base child support.
Debra argues that because the court did not find a permanent change of
circumstances, such findings are not necessary, the prior order stands, and it need not
go through the process required in §78-45-7.2.
When presented with a petition to modify a child support order, the trial
court may not simply rely upon a prior stipulation entered into by the
parties and accepted by the court." Rather, the court must apply Utah
Code §78-45-7.2, which allows modifications if a party is able to
demonstrate that a substantial material change in circumstances has
occurred between the entry of the divorce decree containing the support
order and the filing of the modification petition.
Diener v. Diener at 1180.
The trial court's finding of "no substantial change of circumstances" without going
through the steps of identifying incomes and determining base child support under those
current incomes is contrary to process required in §78-45-7.2. Diener v. Diener dictates
that the process under former subsection 6 (now subsection 8) should be approached in
the following manner:
First, the court must determine the petitioner's present adjusted gross
income, as well as the respondent's present adjusted gross income, and
then combine those amounts creating a combined adjusted gross income
amount. Second, the court must apply the Guidelines to the combined
adjusted gross income figures, see Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.14 (2002), to
determine the amount that has been established as the presumptive
support amount for the identified adjusted gross income level of the
parties. Third, the court must determine proportionality, or what portion of
the presumptive child support amount is attributable to the petitioner
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-45-7.7. Finally, the court must determine
whether the petitioner's current obligation, as set by a pre-existing court
order, is within ten percent (10%) of the presumptive figure arrived at
through thd modification petition. If there is a variance greater than 10%,
the statute directs that "the court shall adjust the amount to that which is
provided for in the guidelines." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6)(b).
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Diener v. Diener at 1182.
Under the current §78-45-7.2 (8)(a) "the court shall, taking into account the best
interest of the child, determine whether there is a difference between the amount
ordered and the amount that would be required under the guidelines." The court is then
to determine whether "there is a difference of 10 % or more and the difference not of a
temporary nature." At that point, the court "shall adjust the amount to that which is
provided for in the guidelines." §78-45-7.2 (8)(a). The present findings do not show that
the court has gone through this process. The court eluded the necessary steps,
particularly where Debra's income was concerned.
A modification under §78-45-7.2 (9)(a) permits a court to consider whether a
substantial change of circumstances has occurred prior to calculating the base support
figures to justify a modification. The child support act lists six factors which are to be
considered in determining whether a substantial change has occurred. They are not
exclusive, but serve as guidelines. Bovce V. Gobel 2000 UT Ap 237, 8 P.3d 1042, fn 4
& 5. Accordingly, if the court had properly considered Debra's actual earnings, and the
absence of any need for her to care for young children in the home, certain factors listed
as relevant in subsection (9)(b), i.e. (iv) material changes of 30% or more in the income
of a parent, and (iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn, would have come
into play.
Although Debra argues that Steven did not specifically request a review under
section 8(a) The Petition to Modify included an implicit request to modify under either
applicable statute, as it had been greater than three years and Steven asked the court to
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reevaluate Debra's income. (R48) Steven's petition was sufficient to alert Debra and
the court that he believed her income had changed and should be considered in the
modification. In fact it is rarely possible to determine the opposing party's actual
income prior to initiating a petition to modify a divorce decree, and entering into
discovery regarding both parties' incomes.
Both parties provided evidence regarding Debra's current income and ability to
earn. (T209, 224-5, 232, 233, & 240) Debra's earnings were certainly an issue at trial.
The evidence was unrefuted that Debra was working and the argument that she should
have some income attributed to her was unopposed. (T240) Therefore, the court went
beyond its discretionary boundaries by omitting a finding on Debra's income, and by
finding that it was "obviously anticipated that Debra would have to work to support
herself and the children." (R509)
Debra argues that the original trial court anticipated that Debra would begin
working and that she and the children would have needs beyond the child support
amount. This argument is not supported by the Decree or facts of this case. In fact,
Debra's remarriage immediately after entry of the decree demonstrates that she
voluntarily relinquished alimony and may not have planned on working. Debra's
argument implies that Steven should continue to be responsible for Debra's needs after
her remarriage. Once Steven's obligation to provide Debra alimony was extinguished,
Debra's needs should not have been a factor in the court's current child support
decisions.
When explaining the outcome of a modification petition, the court must
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make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what
circumstances have changed and why these changes support the
modification made [to] the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support
the judgment.
Diener v. Diener at 1181
The court failed to make the required findings here and the issue should be
remanded.
Point III. THE CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OR THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING CHILD
SUPPORT ARREARAGE AND THE FINDINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE
THE COURT'S METHOD AND PROCESS OF CALCULATION
Debra has cited a number of reasons the court did not rule in Steven's favor on
his requested reduction of child support. (Appellee's Brief 12, 15, 22) Steven did not
challenge the findings indicating the court's reasoning for refusing to find Steven
disabled for child support purposes. However, the findings regarding the actual
judgment ordered should be limited to an accounting of what child support was owed,
what payments were credited and what balance remained. The Court's disdain for
Steven should not impact the calculation of support owed. Debra never challenged the
accuracy of Steven's records of actual cash payments. The Court's opinion of Steven's
ability to work should not be a factor in calculating the amount of child support owed,
and the resulting judgment. Petitioner's Exhibits P2 through 7 totaling what Debra
claimed was owed at the beginning of trial does not match the final judgment amount.
The summarization of arrearage was not done in a manner that can be followed. The
judge's directions were vague as he stated :
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All unpaid child support amounts prior to October 1, 2001, and if the
$20.00 per month has not been paid, they are owing and may be
reduced to a judgment....
From September 1, 2004, the child support payable will return to the
amount of $884.00 per month. Steven may deduct up to three
months future payments from his child support obligation for money
paid to the children by SSDI...
because there were some additional periods SSDI paid for the
children before this court started crediting him, no interest on
delinquent child support prior to October 2001 shall be awarded to
Debra.
(R515-16)
The resulting findings that "Based on the evidence the Court determines
that there is an arrearage in child support due to the Petitioner in the amount of
$17,377.74" (R516), are not sufficient to explain the mathematical calculations
performed by Debra in computing the final sum.
The evidence supporting the final findings is absent from this record. The
court failed to calculate the actual arrearage, ordering Petitioner's attorney to draft
the findings of fact and order. (R462) Debra could have easily included her final
worksheets or calculations in the findings so that they could be followed and
double checked. Debra's prior counsel who calculated the arrearage instead of
the court, has withdrawn without providing these figures.
When both parties asked for a hearing on Steven's various objections, the
court's unexpected denial prevented the issue from being argued below.
Respondent's objection to the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law should
have been sufficient to trigger a hearing. Additionally a detailed objection was not
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required to maintain an appeal under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52.
Debra provided very little actual evidence as to what child support was
owed. This is described in Appellant's brief page 36-37. Debra's child support
arrearage worksheets, Exhibits P2-7, were prepared prior to trial. Debra relies on
this as the evidence supporting the judgment. (Appellee's Brief 25 ) The court's
memorandum order did not correspond precisely with Petitioner's proposed
judgment or Respondent's proposed judgment for arrearage. Petitioner's
proposed judgment included application of interest. The court denied interest as
"there were some additional periods Petitioner received SSDI payments before the
court started crediting him . . . " (R516)
There is no document or explanation in the court file corresponding with the
amount of the final judgment. Petitioner's written closing arguments are
inexplicably missing from the court file, and it is not possible to determine whether
the court relied on these. Nonetheless, if Petitioner's Exhibit P2-7, or her closing
argument exhibit ® 412-414) was the basis for the judgment, it is clearly in error
because, Petitioner included interest from April 1999 forward, failed to assess the
$20 per month from October 1, 2001 through date of judgment and also failed to
account for the Social Security Disability payments from October 1, 2001 through
the effective date of judgment. (R412 - 414.) 2
2

It is unclear why the court chose October 1, 2001 as the date for temporary
reduction of child support, when the prior temporary orders had set August 1, 2001 as
the date.
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Point IV. STEVEN DID NOT PURSUE AN APPEAL ON MEDICAL EXPENSES
AND IT IS UNNECESSARY TO DISMISS THIS ISSUE
Debra is correct that the issue of unreimbursed medical expense was listed
in the Notice of Appeal. Although mentioned in the Notice of Appeal, Respondent
later determined not to develop that argument. It is not necessary to dismiss the
issue or make a ruling on it as it was not briefed or argued.
Point V. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED OR AWARDED IF
THE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
Steven's request for reconsideration of attorney fees should be considered.
An appeal is properly raised if a notice of appeal mdesignate[s] the judgment or
order, or part thereof, appealed from."' In re B.B.. 2002 UT App 82.1J9, 45 P.3d
527. Although Steven did not specifically list the issue of attorney fees in his
Notice of Appeal, he stated that he "appealed "the Order Dismissing Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce and Judgment of the Honorable Roger S. Dutson
entered in this matter on April 18, 2005 in the Second District Court, Weber
County, State of Utah." This language was sufficient to put Debra on notice of the
judgment and order which was being appealed.
"Despite the apparent rigidity of rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, "[njotices of appeal are to be liberally construed." In re B.B.. 2002 UT
App 82 at 1f9 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
In In Re B.B. the notice of appeal failed to cite attorney fees as an issue on
appeal. The court concluded that "although the notice provided was "not ideal," it
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was sufficient to notify the parties of the orders being appealed, id. Other
appellate cases have granted leniency regarding adequacy of Notice of Appeal.
These include: Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 886 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah
1994) (holding notice of appeal which failed to designate that appeal was being
taken from summary judgment as well as from final judgment was adequate
because '"[t]here [wa]s no requirement that the notice designate intermediate
orders which [were] to be raised as issues on appeal'"; U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A.
Gen.. Inc.. 1999 UT App 303,1ilJ26-27, 990 P.2d 945 (holding appeal from final
order denying motion entitled "Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing
Plaintiffs Complaint" encompassed appeal from summary judgment although
appellant did not identify summary judgment in notice of appeal. State v.
Valdovinos 2003 UT App 432, 82 P.2d 1163.
The Notice of Appeal certainly put Debra on notice that the final order and
judgment would be challenged. Furthermore, Debra has not demonstrated that
she is disadvantaged by including that issue and she has had ample opportunity
to respond to this request.
Steven's request is based on whether this court should overturn or remand
the trial court's decision. The trial court held Steven responsible for "causing most
of the attorney fees and expenses incurred" even though it initially found merit in
his requests and granted temporary modifications. (R462) Debra argues that
because Steven engaged in dilatory behavior, attorney fees should be upheld.
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However, as explained previously, supra page 6 many of the delays were not
caused by Steven and were beyond his control. Steven should not have been
construed to be causing problems of delay under those circumstances. If these
factors influenced the court's ruling on the legal decisions or performance of the
statutory procedures, Steven would be entitled to reconsideration of the allocation
of fees. If the trial court has misapplied the law, or abused its discretion, equity
would call for the ruling on attorney fees be overturned.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not properly follow the governing statutes which
determine how Social Security payments should be applied, how child support
should be calculated and how judgments should be reached. The court, instead
made decisions which were contrary to the statutes and skipped some processes
which are required by the statutes. Therefore, the appellate court should take the
following actions:
1. This court should overrule the trial court's decision that the children's
social security payments would not be credited against Steven's child support
obligation because it is contrary to the statutory mandate and the legislature's
intent.
2. The Court should vacate the dismissal of the Petition to Modify,
remanding the matter for proper analysis under Utah Code §78-45-7.2, and
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considering both parties incomes.
3. The court should remand the matter for further detailed findings on the
child support arrearage, so that it can be determined whether the judgment
properly reflects the court's specific rulings.
4. The Court need not make a ruling on the unreimbursed medical costs, as
it was not briefed or argued.
5. The court should revise the attorney fees award if it finds that the trial
court has misapplied the law or abused its discretion.
6. The court should grant Steven attorney fees if he is successful on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this A> day of January 2006,
%A^

CATHERINE F. LABATTE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
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